Mediation Efforts in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh mediation occupied international diplomacy for more than three decades and ended without a negotiated settlement. From 1992 the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the mountainous enclave sat with the OSCE Minsk Group, the longest-running mediation format in Europe. That process produced a durable ceasefire in 1994 and, later, an agreed framework for a settlement. The core questions were never resolved at the table. They were settled by force, in 2020 and again in September 2023, when Azerbaijan retook the territory and more than 100,000 Karabakh Armenians left for Armenia within two weeks.

That outcome makes the mediation record more instructive, not less. Research on mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, conducted at Uppsala University’s Department of Peace and Conflict Research and drawing on interviews with the Swedish team that chaired the OSCE when the 1994 ceasefire was reached, identified problems of timing, coordination and recognition that recur in peace processes everywhere. Readers new to the field may want to start with this overview of how mediation works; the Karabakh case tests almost every rule in it.

This article traces the record from the Minsk Group era to the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation talks that followed the conflict’s violent end.

Nagorno-Karabakh mediation under the OSCE Minsk Group

The armed conflict escalated as the Soviet Union collapsed. In December 1991 Nagorno-Karabakh unilaterally proclaimed itself a republic and held parliamentary elections; by January 1992 fighting with the Azerbaijani government had begun, accompanied by ethnic cleansing on both sides. Estimates cited in the Uppsala research put the death toll of that first war at between 10,000 and 20,000, with close to 1.5 million people displaced.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, later the OSCE, took the lead in 1992 by deciding to convene a peace conference in Minsk. The conference never met, but the preparatory body of concerned states, which included Sweden, Russia and Italy alongside the parties, became known as the Minsk Group. Its early years were marked by open rivalry between the OSCE track and a parallel Russian effort. The 1994 ceasefire that halted the war was brokered primarily by Russia, with Sweden chairing the OSCE process. From the late 1990s the group’s work was steadied by a permanent co-chairmanship of France, Russia and the United States.

The research is blunt about why the guns fell silent in 1994. Azerbaijan had suffered heavy battlefield losses, including more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in the first four months of that year, while Karabakh forces had taken control of large areas beyond the old autonomous oblast.

“It was the intensity and cost of the fighting that drew the parties to the negotiation table.”

Mutually painful deadlock, not persuasion, created the opening. Mediators supplied the framework through which the parties could stop.

What the research found: five recurring problems

The study distilled lessons that the European Union was urged to absorb. First, prevention: an early opportunity was lost in 1992 because both sides still believed they could win militarily and Western engagement was neither focused nor united. Second, urgency: once a costly deadlock creates willingness to talk, mediators must capitalise quickly, because phased processes can drain that incentive. The Swedish team designed a step-by-step approach meant to build trust through small agreements first, but the process stalled early and the links between steps proved too weak.

Third, coordination. Multiple mediators competed for the file, and Russia at critical moments sought to monopolise the effort and marginalise the OSCE.

“When there are many mediators available, the belligerents can play out the different mediators against each other.”

This forum shopping reduced everyone’s influence over the parties. Fourth, recognition: Azerbaijan refused any procedural step that might imply statehood for the Karabakh authorities, which shaped everything from the structure of talks to the seating arrangements. Fifth, the link between mediation and peacekeeping: the parties could not credibly commit to a settlement without third-party guarantees, yet no peacekeeping force was ever agreed. Unlike the conflicts in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh had no international monitors on the ground, and the peace rested on a balance of power alone. These findings fed directly into arguments for a stronger EU conflict prevention policy.

The Madrid Principles and the frozen years

In November 2007 the Minsk Group co-chairs presented Armenia and Azerbaijan with a framework that became known as the Madrid Principles. Its core elements were the return of the occupied districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, an interim status with guarantees for security and self-governance, a corridor linking the territory to Armenia, a future determination of final status through a legally binding expression of will, the right of return for the displaced, and international security guarantees including a peacekeeping operation.

The package was discussed for over a decade without agreement. A Russian-hosted summit in Kazan in June 2011 came close but collapsed over final details. Escalation returned in April 2016, when four days of fighting along the line of contact killed dozens. The mediation format survived; the incentives it needed did not. Neither side faced the kind of deadlock that had produced the 1994 ceasefire, and domestic politics in both capitals hardened around maximal positions.

The 2020 war and the ceasefire of 10 November

On 27 September 2020 Azerbaijan launched a large-scale offensive, backed politically and militarily by Turkey. In 44 days of fighting it recovered much of the territory lost in the 1990s, including the city of Shusha. Thousands of soldiers died on both sides. The war ended not through the Minsk Group but through a trilateral ceasefire statement brokered by Russia and signed on 10 November 2020, under which around 2,000 Russian peacekeepers deployed to the remaining Armenian-populated core of the territory and to the Lachin corridor connecting it to Armenia.

The arrangement confirmed a pattern the research had described a decade earlier: when coordination fails, the mediator with forces on the ground writes the terms. The Minsk Group co-chairs were reduced to issuing statements. The guarantee problem had finally been answered, but by a single interested power rather than an international mission, and only for as long as that power chose to enforce it.

September 2023: the end of the self-declared republic

From December 2022 the Lachin corridor was blockaded, cutting the territory’s supply line to Armenia and producing shortages of food, fuel and medicine. On 19 September 2023 Azerbaijan launched a one-day military operation; the Karabakh authorities agreed to disarm within 24 hours. What followed was an exodus documented by UN agencies and reporters on the ground: more than 100,000 people, nearly the entire Armenian population of the enclave, crossed into Armenia within about two weeks. The self-declared republic formally dissolved itself on 1 January 2024, and Russian peacekeepers withdrew ahead of schedule in 2024.

Three decades of Nagorno-Karabakh mediation thus closed with the disputed territory under full Azerbaijani control and effectively emptied of the population whose status the talks had been meant to settle. A concise account of the conflict’s arc is kept in the BBC’s Nagorno-Karabakh profile.

From mediation to normalisation

Diplomacy did not stop; it changed subject. Since 2021 the agenda has been bilateral normalisation between Armenia and Azerbaijan: border delimitation, transport links, prisoners and a peace treaty. The European Union hosted repeated leader-level meetings in Brussels from December 2021 and deployed a civilian monitoring mission on the Armenian side of the border in February 2023. The United States hosted negotiating rounds in 2023, and in March 2025 the two governments announced agreement on the text of a peace treaty. At a White House summit in August 2025 the leaders initialled the agreement, signed a joint declaration and jointly asked the OSCE to close the Minsk process; the organisation moved to wind down those structures the following month.

The lessons of the earlier record still apply. Mediators succeeded when they matched the moment of deadlock, coordinated rather than competed, and could underwrite what they proposed; they failed when any of those conditions lapsed. Those conditions depend on institutions, but also on the individual envoys involved, a theme explored in this journal’s discussion of what makes an effective mediator and its reporting on private diplomacy in crisis management. Further coverage of negotiation practice is collected under mediation and dialogue.

Frequently asked questions

What was the OSCE Minsk Group?

The OSCE format created in 1992 to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Named after a planned peace conference in Minsk that never convened, it was co-chaired from the late 1990s by France, Russia and the United States, and produced frameworks such as the Madrid Principles but never a final settlement.

What were the Madrid Principles?

A settlement framework presented by the Minsk Group co-chairs in November 2007. It combined the return of occupied districts to Azerbaijan, an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh, a corridor to Armenia, a legally binding future vote on final status, the right of return for displaced people, and international security guarantees including peacekeeping. It was discussed for years but never signed.

What ended the first Karabakh war in 1994?

A ceasefire reached in May 1994, brokered primarily by Russia while Sweden chaired the OSCE process. Research on the negotiations found the decisive factor was battlefield exhaustion: Azerbaijan had suffered heavy losses, and both sides judged continued fighting too costly for too little gain. Full-scale war stayed away for 26 years, but no peace treaty followed.

Why did Nagorno-Karabakh mediation never produce a peace treaty?

Research points to compounding failures: the early window in 1992 was missed while both sides expected victory; competing mediators let the parties shop between forums; Azerbaijan resisted any step implying recognition of the Karabakh authorities; and no peacekeeping mission was ever agreed to guarantee a deal. Once the front lines stabilised, neither government faced pressure strong enough to force concessions.

What role did recognition play in the talks?

A central one. Azerbaijan saw the conflict as an interstate dispute with Armenia and refused any step, such as seating Karabakh representatives as equals, that might imply recognition of their claim to statehood. Armenia presented it as an internal conflict between Baku and Karabakh. This disagreement over who the parties were shaped every negotiation.

What changed with the 2020 war?

The 44-day war of autumn 2020 reversed the military balance. Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, recovered most of the territories lost in the 1990s. The Russia-brokered ceasefire of 10 November 2020 placed around 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in the remaining Armenian-populated area and sidelined the Minsk Group entirely.

What happened to the Karabakh Armenians in 2023?

After a nine-month blockade of the Lachin corridor, Azerbaijan launched a one-day offensive on 19 September 2023 that forced the Karabakh authorities to disarm. Within about two weeks more than 100,000 people, nearly the entire Armenian population, fled to Armenia, according to UN agencies. The self-declared republic formally dissolved on 1 January 2024.

Who mediates between Armenia and Azerbaijan now?

Since 2021 diplomacy has run through several channels. The European Union hosted leader-level talks in Brussels and deployed a border monitoring mission on the Armenian side in 2023. The United States hosted negotiating rounds and, in August 2025, a White House summit at which the two leaders initialled a peace agreement. Direct bilateral contacts have also grown in importance.

Does the Minsk Group still exist?

No. After Armenia and Azerbaijan jointly requested its closure at the August 2025 Washington summit, the OSCE decided in September 2025 to wind down the Minsk process and its related structures. That formally ended a format operating since 1992, though it had played no substantive role since the 2020 war.

What lessons does the case offer for future mediation?

Three stand out. Timing: mediators achieve most when a costly deadlock makes both sides genuinely ready to settle. Coordination: rival mediation tracks invite forum shopping and weaken everyone’s hand. Guarantees: parties rarely commit to peace without credible third-party enforcement, so mediation should be linked to peacekeeping capability from the start.